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Cohen: Congress Should Amend 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3143

CONGRESS SHOULD AMEND 18 U.S.C. § 3143
Mark . Cohen*

I. INTRODUCTION

Since the United States Supreme Court's decisions in United States
v. Booker,1 and its progeny, United States District Court Judges have had
greater flexibility when sentencing persons convicted of federal criminal
offenses.2 Judges are no longer required to impose a sentence within the
range set forth in the United States Sentencing Guidelines ("USSG").3
Instead, those ranges are now considered recommendations which must
be considered when imposing a sentence. Judicial sentencing discretion
is still strictly curtailed, however, by United States Code ("U.S.C.")
statutes which impose mandatory terms of incarceration in certain
circumstances. This Article addresses one exceptionally unjust result of
the U.S.C. statutory framework: the intersection of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)
and 18 U.S.C. § 3143(a)(2) which requires that defendants convicted of
narcotics and violent offenses must be incarcerated between conviction
and sentencing, even if they had been deemed suitable to be at liberty
while the prosecution was pending and even if they might not be

* I am a proud alumnus of the Hofstra University School of Law (1985) and a founding
member of Cohen, Frankel & Ruggiero, LLP, where my practice focuses on criminal defense of
United States and New York State prosecutions. To every one of my federal clients that has been
subjected to the appalling consequences of this unjust law, I dedicate this to you. To my late
parents, Ceil and Harold, who both struggled so hard and sacrificed so much to send me to law
school, I only wish that they could witness me "make" the Law Review, albeit thirty-six years after
1L! I am truly grateful to the editors of the Hofstra Law Review for this humbling honor.
t A version of this Article was originally published in Bloomberg Law's White Collar &
CriminalLaw News, Aug. 31, 2018. Copyright 2018 by The Bureau of National Affairs, Inc. (800372-1033) <http://www.bna.com>.
1. 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
2. Hughes v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 1765, 1772-75 (2018); Beckles v. United States, 137
S. Ct. 886, 892-95 (2017); Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 46-47, 51-52 (2007); Booker, 543
U.S. at 224, 233, 264-65.
3. Booker, 543 U.S. at 226-27, 233-35 (holding that the mandatory sentencing guidelines
system was unconstitutional). These guidelines are now considered advisory. Id.
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sentenced to a term of incarceration.4 In this Article, I will discuss how
this result is created, describe two hypothetical examples of how it may
occur, and provide a simple solution to this curtailed judicial discretion,
which restores to sentencing district court judges the power and
discretion to release some currently ineligible defendants awaiting
imposition of sentence but only if there are indicia that the public and
the integrity of the criminal justice system would be protected.5
18 U.S.C. §3143(a)(2) delineates the eligibility of a postconviction/pre-sentence defendant to remain at liberty, either on bail or
recognizance, pending sentencing.6 Specifically, 18 U.S.C. § 3143(a)(2)
provides that:
The judicial officer shall order that a person who has been found guilty
of an offense in a case described in subparagraph (A), (B), or (C) of
subsection (f)(1) of section 3142 and is awaiting imposition or
execution of sentence be detained unless--(A)(i) the judicial officer
finds there is a substantial likelihood that a motion for acquittal or new
trial will be granted; or (ii) an attorney for the Government has
recommended that no sentence of imprisonment be imposed on the
person; and (B) the judicial officer finds by clear and convincing
evidence that the person is not7 likely to flee or pose a danger to any
other person or the community.
This statute operates in a particularly restrictive manner once a guilty
plea is accepted by a United States District Court Judge 8 or a guilty
verdict is returned by a trial jury in cases involving certain narcotics
offenses9 and crimes of violence. 0 While mandatory detention is
4. See infra Part II; see also 18 U.S.C. §§ 3143(a)(2), 3553(a) (2012). With the enactment of
the Mandatory Detention for Offenders Convicted of Serious Crimes Act, the 101 st Congressional
session (1989-1990) amended the Bail Reform Act to require the detention, pending sentence or
appeal, of any person found guilty of a crime of violence, an offense for which the maximum
sentence is life imprisonment or death, or a drug offense for which a maximum term of
imprisonment often years or more is prescribed, unless there is a substantial likelihood of acquittal
or a new trial or the government is not recommending imprisonment and the person is not likely to
flee or pose a danger to the community. Mandatory Detention for Offenders Convicted of Serious
Crimes Act, Pub. L. No. 101-647, tit. IX, 104 Stat. 4826 (1990) (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 31413143, 3145); Bail Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1976 (codified at 18 U.S.C.
§ 3141-3142).
5. See infra Part 11 A-C.
6. 18 U.S.C. § 3143(a)(2).
7. Id.
8. District court judges alone have the sole authority to accept felony guilty pleas pursuant to
of the United States Constitution. Sherilyn Streicker, How Judges Accept andReject Plea
Article mH
Deals, NOLO, https://www.nolo.com/legal-encyclopedia/can-the-judge-reject-plea-deal.html (last
visited Apr. 22, 2019).
9. 21 U.S.C. § 841(a), 841(b)(1)(A)-(C).
10. 18 U.S.C. § 16.
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arguably appropriate in a majority of these cases, some offenders are
found to have only limited participation in an offense and are therefore
eligible for non-custodial sentences. As a result, they are in the
unfortunate, and perhaps prejudicial, position of being incarcerated for
the time between conviction and sentencing, no matter how compliant
they have been with the conditions of the terms of their release pending
prosecution and no matter how likely it is that they will not be sentenced
to a term of incarceration. This anomaly became more evident to
criminal defense practitioners after the ruling in Booker, in which
the Supreme Court held that the mandatory application of the USSG
was unconstitutional."
Before the decision rendered in Booker, 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1)
required a court to sentence defendants within the delineated USSG
ranges of various types of sentences, unless a rare downward or upward
departure was available and appropriate.12 In Gall v. UnitedStates,13 the
Supreme Court held that after correctly calculating the applicable range,
a "district judge should then consider all of the § 3553(a) factors to
determine whether they support the sentence requested by a party"' 4 and
"[i]f he decides that an outside-the-Guidelines sentence is warranted, he
must consider the extent of the deviation and ensure that the justification
is sufficiently compelling to support the degree of the variance."' 5
Since Booker, Crosby, Gall,and its progenies, a sentencing court is
required to consider the nature and circumstances of the offense and the
history and characteristics of the defendant; the need for the sentence
imposed to reflect the seriousness of the offense, promote respect for the
law, provide just punishment for the offense, afford adequate deterrence
to criminal conduct, protect the public from further crimes of the
defendant, provide the defendant with needed training or treatment; the
kinds of sentences available; the sentencing ranges established by the
USSG for the crime(s) of conviction; pertinent policy statements of the
USSG Commission; the need to avoid unwarranted sentencing
disparities; and the need to provide restitution to victims.' 6
For more than a decade, federal courts have considered all of the 18
U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors, including the USSG, in order to arrive at a
sentence.17 Before Booker, Crosby, and Gall, in high-quantity narcotics
11. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 227, 245-46, 258, 264-65 (2005).
12. United States v. Crosby, 397 F.3d 103, 111 (2d Cir. 2005).
13. 552 U.S. 38 (2007).
14. Id.at 49-50.
15. Id.at 50.
16. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2012).
17. See Crosby, 397 F.3d at 113; see also U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1BI.I(c)
(U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N 2016).
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cases charged under a statute which included a mandatory minimum
term of imprisonment, certain Criminal History Category I offenders
were entitled to apply for relief from a sentence at or above the
mandatory minimum by making a proffer to the government. 18 This form
of relief, known as a "safety valve," enables certain offenders to receive
a USSG sentence below the mandatory term of incarceration if credited
by the government. 19 Since Booker, Crosby, and Gall, eligible offenders
enjoy an additional benefit that permits them to seek a non-incarceratory
sentence variance for low-level participation in trafficking crimes.2 °
Similarly, in certain violent offense cases, though no safety valve
consideration exists,2' a defendant whose role in the offense was limited,
minor, or minimal can receive a variance from a USSG range of
incarceration to a non-incarceratory sentence.
II. PRE-SENTENCING PROBLEMS CREATED BY THE BAIL STATUTE

In the vast majority of cases, 18 U.S.C. § 3143(b)(2) empowers
only the government to prevent the mandatory detention of a person
convicted of a crime delineated in 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f)(1)(A), (B), and
(C) while that person is pending sentencing.22 Such a person may remain
at liberty only if "there is a substantial likelihood that a motion for
acquittal or new trial will be granted"2 3 or if "an attorney for the
government has recommended that no sentence of imprisonment be
imposed on the person" 24 and the presiding judge determines "by clear
and convincing evidence that the person is not likely to flee or pose a
danger to any other person or the community."2 5 Setting aside those
circumstances relating to a motion for an acquittal or a new trial because
convictions after trial represent a very small minority of cases, the
requirement of a recommendation from the government is problematic
for defendants in many jurisdictions.
18. See, e.g., Melendez v. United States, 518 U.S. 120, 122-23 (1996); United States v.
Jeffers, 329 F.3d 94, 96 (2d Cir. 2003).
19. Federal Sentencing: The Basics, USSC, https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/
research-and-publications/research-pubications/2017/20170711_Mand-Min.pdf (last visited Apr.
22, 2019).
20. See, e.g., Gall, 552 U.S. at 56-57; United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 267 (2005);
Crosby, 397 F.3d at 112.
21. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1951.
22. Id. § 3143(a)(2)(A)(i).
23. Id.
24. Id. § 3143(a)(2)(A)(ii).
25. Id. § 3143(a)(2)(B). Sentencing judges are permitted to allow an individual awaiting
sentence to remain at liberty on bail or on their own recognizance while pending sentencing only if
the crime of conviction is not delineated in 18 U.S.C. § 3142(t)(1)(A)-(C) and if the defendant is
not a flight risk or a danger to the community. Id. § 3143(a).
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"In the United States Attorney's Office for the Southern District of
New York, for example, local defense practitioners know that office
policy prohibits prosecutors from making specific sentencing
recommendations." 6 Typically, the government will make only a
general recommendation that the court impose a sentence within the
USSG range or, at best, not object to a variance therefrom or concede
that a variance would be appropriate. Thus, at least by custom and
practice, defendants in this jurisdiction (and many others) cannot avoid
mandatory pre-sentence detention, sometimes for months, while the presentencing process proceeds toward the sentencing date.
Consider the following hypothetical illustrations of individuals
convicted by guilty pleas to a narcotics conspiracy 7 and a Hobbs Act
robbery conspiracy, 28 respectively.
A. Narcotics Conspiracy
Ms. X is a fifty-year-old naturalized citizen of the United States.
She has lived at the same residence in New York City for over twenty
years and has been employed and filing tax returns for the same length
of time. She is also a single mother of three teenaged children, whom
she solely supports. She has no prior criminal record.
Mr. Y is a family friend from Ms. X's native country.
Unbeknownst to Ms. X, Mr. Y has recently established a thriving
narcotics trafficking business by sending narcotics from his location
overseas to the United States. Mr. Y contacted Ms. X after obtaining her
telephone number from a mutual acquaintance. Although he was initially
merely social, over the course of the next year, Mr. Y applied significant
pressure on Ms. X to become involved in his narcotics trafficking
activities, which she resisted. Finally, she relented and agreed to
participate in a single narcotics transaction. Mr. Y notified Ms. X that he
was sending an unknown individual, Mr. Z, to meet with and leave
narcotics with Ms. X. She was not informed of the type of drug or the
quantity she would receive, she had no pecuniary interest in the
transaction, she had no idea how much compensation she would earn for
accepting the package and delivering it to Mr. Y, and she had no
understanding of the size or scope of Mr. Y's narcotics business
overseas or in the United States. Ms. X's activity was limited to a series

26. Mark I. Cohen, INSIGHT: Congress Should Amend 18 USC § 3143, BLOOMBERG L.
(Aug. 31, 2018, 12:45 PM), https://www.news.bloomberglaw.com/white-collar-and-criminallaw/insight-congress-should-amend-18-use-3143.
27. See infra Partf.A.
28. 18 U.S.C. § 1951; see infra Part f.B.
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of telephone calls with unknown individuals at the explicit direction of
Mr. Y over the course of a couple of days to arrange receipt of the
narcotics package from Mr. Z. The scope of her agreement was to accept
the package, which she only knew would contain an unknown quantity
of an unknown type of narcotics, from Mr. Z and to deliver it to Mr. Y.
Federal agents arrested Ms. X when she accepted the package from
Mr. Z. The package was revealed to contain just under a kilogram of
heroin, although Ms. X did not know the quantity and type until she was
so advised by law enforcement officials. She immediately confessed to
her involvement in the crime in a post-arrest, post-Miranda statement.
Ms. X was presented for arraignment on a complaint before a United
States Magistrate Judge in the Southern District of New York. She was
charged with a narcotics offense for which, if convicted, she would
receive a mandatory minimum sentence of five years incarceration29 and
was released from custody on a personal recognizance bond the same
day. For many months after her release on bail, Ms. X was supervised by
the United States Pre-Trial Services Agency ("Pre-Trial Services").3
She was in full compliance with all of the conditions set by the court
and the Pre-Trial Services officer who supervised her pre-conviction
bail status.
Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f)(1)-(5) and USSG § 5C1.2(a)(l)(5), Ms. X applied for and attended a "safety valve" proffer session with
her attorney, the prosecutor, and the federal agent who arrested her in
order to seek relief from the mandatory five-year minimum term of
incarceration. 31 During the proffer, Ms. X fully accepted responsibility
for her conduct and demonstrated true remorse.
The prosecution notified the defense of its intention to credit Ms.
X's safety valve proffer and recommend to the sentencing court that she
be sentenced without regard to the statutory five-year minimum term of
incarceration. Moreover, during plea negotiations, the prosecutor agreed
to designate Ms. X a "minimal participant" pursuant to USSG
§ 3B1.2(a),32 the lowest level participant in the case. The calculation of
29. 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)-(b)(1)(B) (defining violations and setting out a penalty of a minimum
of five years and a maximum of forty years, unless death or serious bodily injury occurs, in which
case the defendant shall serve not less than twenty years nor more than life).
30. See Probation and Pretrial Services - Mission, U.S. CouRTs, https://www.
uscourts.gov/services-forms/probation-and-pretrial-services/probation-and-pretrial-services-mission
(last visited Apr. 22, 2019).
31. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f)(1)-(5) (permitting the court to deviate from a statute's minimum
sentence after the government has made a recommendation and a finding that the defendant meets
the factors set forth therein); U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5C1.2(a)(1)-(5) (U.S.
SENTENCING COMM'N 2016).

32.

U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3B1.2(a).
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her Offense Level pursuant to the USSG was driven by the quantity of
heroin in the package (between 700 and 999 grams), over which she had
no control.33 Her Offense Level was reduced because of her minimal
participation,34 safety valve eligibility,3 5 and acceptance of
responsibility.36 The combination of Ms. X's adjusted Offense Level and
the fact that she had no other criminal history resulted in a USSG
recommendation of thirty to thirty-seven months of incarceration.
Based upon Ms. X's personal history and characteristics and her
minimal role in the offense, she appears to be a good candidate for a
non-incarceratory sentence. However, despite the equities in her favor
and her strict compliance with the requirements of Pre-Trial Services, 18
U.S.C. § 3143(a)(2) and § 3142(f)(1)(A)-(C) require Ms. X to be
incarcerated upon the district court judge's acceptance of her guilty plea
pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11 (b).37 Because Ms. X
has accepted responsibility for her commission of the offense, thereby
demonstrating remorse for her conduct, preserving government and
judicial resources and earning a reduction of her USSG Offense Level,
38
she cannot, of course, make a motion for acquittal or a new trial.
Similarly, if her case was pending in a jurisdiction such as the Southern
District of New York, the government's office policy would prohibit the
prosecutor from making a recommendation, at any time, to the judge that
she not receive a sentence of imprisonment. 39 Therefore, no matter how
clear and convincing the judicial officer may fmd that she is "not likely
to flee or pose a danger to any other person or the community,"' and no
matter how likely the possibility that she will receive a sentence of
imprisonment, she must be jailed until her sentencing hearing, leaving
her three children to be cared for by family members and hoping that she
will have a job to return to in order to support them when she is released
from custody.

33. Id. § 2D1.1(c)(6).
34. Id.§ 3B1.2(a)-(b).
35. Id.§ 2D1.1(b)(17); see also OFFICE OF GEN. COUNSEL, U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N,
PRIMER:

DRUG

GUIDELINES

53

(2018),

https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/training/

primers/2018 PrimerDrugs.pdf.
36.

U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3El.1.

37.
38.
39.
40.

18 U.S.C. §§ 3142(f)(1)(A)--C), 3143(a)(2) (2012); FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b).
18 U.S.C. § 3143(a)(2)(A)(i).
Id.§ 3143(aX2)(A)(ii); see Cohen, supra note 26.
18 U.S.C. § 3143(a)(2)(B).
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B. Hobbs Act Robbery
In 2009, co-conspirators B and C planned to intercept an individual
inside the lobby of an apartment building and rob him, at gunpoint, of
narcotics trafficking proceeds. The defendant, Mr. A, did not participate
in planning the robbery. He did not know of its object until after the plan
was made and never knew the intended victim. Mr. A joined the
conspiracy to act as an unarmed lookout while sitting in his motor
vehicle outside the planned robbery location. He was unaware of the
amount of compensation he would receive for his assistance.
On the day of the robbery, after receiving instructions from his coconspirators, Mr. A drove alone to the location and parked across the
street from the building. He did not meet them at the location. During
the robbery, Mr. A remained alone in his vehicle, unarmed and in
cellphone contact with B and C. He was unable to see the events
occurring inside the building and merely watched the building entrance
to warn his co-conspirators of potential police activity nearby. His
compensation for his participation in the robbery was $2000 of the
$30,000 stolen by his co-conspirators. Mr. A was not arrested and
charged with the offense until nearly five years after the robbery
occurred. He had lived a law-abiding life in the area under his true name
for the entire post-robbery period.
Mr. A had no prior or subsequent criminal record. He was a
naturalized United States citizen in his late twenties at the time of his
arrest. He is the father of four children, one of whom suffers from a
mental disability. At the time of his arrest, and for a number of years
prior, he was supporting his family with full-time, lawful employment.
The magistrate judge presiding over his initial appearance released Mr.
A on a bond despite the violent nature of the crime. During the course of
his supervision by Pre-Trial Services, Mr. A was in compliance with his
release conditions and continued to work to support his family.
Mr. A pleaded guilty to a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951, Hobbs Act
robbery. His USSG Offense Level41 was adjusted upward as a result of
factors over which he had no control: his co-conspirators' use of a
firearm42 and the amount of money stolen.43 After receiving a reduction
for his acceptance of responsibility," and considering his criminal
history, the USSG recommended a range of imprisonment of forty-six to
fifty-seven months.
41.
42.
43.
44.

U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B3.1(a).

Id. § 2B3.1(b)(2)(C).
Id. § 2B3.1(b)(7)(B).
Id. § 3E.1.
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Mr. A demonstrated an admirable level of acceptance of
responsibility and contrition for his participation in the crime. By all
accounts, in the nearly five years since the robbery, he had matured and
moved on. He had resisted further illegal conduct, remaining arrest-free.
When he was interviewed by the United States Probation Department
during its pre-sentence investigation, he demonstrated remorse and
regret for his participation in the single robbery.
Based upon Mr. A's personal history and characteristics, the limited
nature of his participation as an aider and abettor in the crime, and his
years of self-rehabilitation, the defense would likely request a
non-incarceratory sentence. Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3143(a)(2), despite
the equities in Mr. A's case, he would be in the same position as Ms. X
in the previous example. 45 The law requires that he be remanded into
custody until his sentencing date. He must leave his common-law wife
with the entire burden to care for their four children, without his
emotional and financial support, for the time between his guilty plea and
sentencing hearing, even if he is ultimately not sentenced to a term
of incarceration.
C. PotentialRemedies
Why not allow judicial officers the discretion to permit a low-level
participant guilty of an offense described in 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f)(1)(A)(C) to be released on bail or recognizance upon a finding that a
defendant is not a flight risk or a danger to others or to the community?
As with the same decision to be made at other stages of the prosecution,
and to the extent that the statute may imply that the government has
greater knowledge of the facts and circumstances of the case than the
defendant, the government would have the opportunity to make any
relevant arguments before the court against continued release, including
that the guilty plea or conviction after trial represents a changed
circumstance in favor of incarcerating the defendant pending sentence.
Defense counsel would presumably focus on the defendant's personal
background, including work and education history and his or her role in
the offense, as well as the defendant's behavior while on bail or
recognizance pending prosecution and compliance with the terms of PreTrial Services supervision.
District court judges have enjoyed greater sentencing discretion
since Booker and its progeny. Judges are no longer strictly controlled by
mandatory sentencing guidelines which are often driven by factors

45. See 18 U.S.C. § 3143(a)(2) (2012).

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2019

9

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 47, Iss. 3 [2019], Art. 8

HOFSTRA LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 47:983

outside the control of low-level offenders (e.g., quantity or type of
narcotics, presence of a weapon, or amount of money stolen in the
commission of a robbery).4 6 Judicial officers are empowered to rule that
imprisonment is not necessary under the circumstances of a particular
case. Therefore, it is illogical that they are obligated to incarcerate a
defendant for the period of time between conviction and sentence, who
was released on bail or recognizance for the duration of the prosecution,
and who will not receive a sentence of imprisonment.
Experience in the Southern District of New York demonstrates that
a procedural loophole exists that enables some offenders implicated by
18 U.S.C. § 3142(f)(1)(A)-(C) to remain at liberty until sentencing.
Defendants whose cases are assigned to a district judge whose practice is
to refer guilty pleas to a magistrate judge have been permitted to remain
at liberty until their sentencing date. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(3) permits a
magistrate judge delegated by a district judge in a felony prosecution to
administer-but not accept-a Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11
guilty plea allocution, provided that a defendant consents to this
delegation. 47 Thus, the time between a magistrate judge's hearing of the
guilty plea and the time of the district judge's acceptance of it operates
as an unofficial reprieve for those whose cases would otherwise fall
within the mandatory detention that 18 U.S.C. § 3143(a)(2) dictates.48
To the extent that defense counsel can use that time to perform the work
that is typically conducted between conviction and sentencing-that is
preparation of a sentencing memorandum, work with the Department of
Probation toward completion of its investigation and preparation of its
report-this will minimize the number of occurrences of low-level
defendants' mandatory incarceration pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3143(a)(2).
Unfortunately, those defendants whose cases have been assigned to
district judges who hear and immediately accept their own guilty pleas
are destined to be incarcerated immediately, despite their eligibility for
no sentence of imprisonment, and even the likelihood that such a
sentence will be imposed. Some practitioners have become adept at
working to steer their client's cases toward guilty plea hearings by
magistrate judges when the assigned district judge has no strict policy of
hearing his or her own guilty pleas.

46. See Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 49-50 (2007); United States v. Booker, 543 U.S.
220, 227, 246 (2005).
47. See U.S. CONST. art. III; 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(3); see also United States v. Williams, 23
F.3d 629, 633-34 (2d Cir. 1994).
48. 18 U.S.C. § 3143(a)(2).
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Another possible unofficial reprieve from post-conviction/presentence incarceration might be to request that a district court judge not
immediately accept the client's guilty plea, thereby avoiding an
immediate conviction4 9 and the mandatory detention provision. This
would require district judges to engage in the unseemly task of
circumventing 18 U.S.C. § 3143(a)(2). One final possibility is to hope
that the United States Attorney's Office starts to make sentencing
recommendations in this limited number of cases.
In the hypothetical cases of Ms. X and Mr. A,5" absent the.
employment of a "loophole," both would have been required to argue for
non-incarceratory sentences while in custody. Experienced defense
attorneys believe it is arguably more of a challenge to convince a district
court judge to sentence someone returned to custody to a period of time
served than to do the same for a similarly-situated defendant who has
avoided mandatory pre-sentence detention to receive a non-incarceratory
sentence. Based upon the sentencing judge's discretion found in 18
U.S.C. § 3553(a), equity dictates that the sentencing judge should enjoy
the same discretion to act when determining someone's post-conviction
bail status as their ultimate sentence, regardless of whether they have
committed a 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f)(1)(A)-(C) offense. 1 I urge
congressional action to ameliorate this anomaly in the statutory scheme
at the intersection of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) and 18 U.S.C. § 3143(a)(2)
that has become more evident during the post-Booker sentencing era.
In my view, the solution is simple in both its principle and its
implementation. Power and discretion should be restored to the district
court judges who can hear the arguments of the government and the
defense as to the particular defendant they will shortly sentence and
make an informed and specific decision regarding whether that
individual, under the specific circumstances which exist, should either
be freed or remain free pending sentence. The amendment of 18 U.S.C.
§ 3143(a)(2)(A)(ii) to change the final word "and"5" to "or" and the
amendment of 18 U.S.C. § 3143(a)(2)(B) to simply use the same
language to create a new subsection 18 U.S.C. § 3143(a)(2)(A)(iii)
would accomplish this goal. The new statute would require judicial
officers to detain defendants pending sentence unless "there is a
substantial likelihood that a motion for acquittal or new trial will be
granted" or the government "has recommended that no sentence of
49.
50.

See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b)(3).
See supra Part I.A-B.

51.

18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).

52.

Id. § 3143(a)(2)(A)(ii) (stating that "an attorney for the Government has recommended

that no sentence of imprisonment be imposed on the person; and' (emphasis added)).
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imprisonment be imposed on the person" or there is "clear and
convincing evidence that the person is not likely to flee or pose a danger
to any other person or the community."
In the limited number of cases in which defendants have committed
mitigating
under unambiguously
crimes
serious
admittedly
circumstances, I submit that their freedom between guilty plea and
sentence should not be forced to rely upon the happenstance of the
procedures of the district judge to whom their prosecution is assigned or
the policies of the United States Attorney's Office in the jurisdiction of
which they committed the crime. Instead, as with all other stages of the
proceeding, and more consistently with the principles of the criminal
justice system, every defendant's liberty should depend upon an
assessment of the risk that the defendant will inflict harm on the public
or will not return to court. Stated more simply, every defendant's liberty
must depend upon due process.53

53.

U.S. CONST. amend. V.
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